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Intellectual Property Expansion: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Right of Publicity 
K.J. Greene

 
INTRODUCTION 
My first reaction upon being asked to write about the right of publicity 
was, ―Oh no, not another right of publicity article!‖  Is there really anything 
left to say about this topic, given the proliferation of writing on it in the last 
ten to fifteen years?  A lot has been said about the right of publicity, most 
of it negative.  The right of publicity, analysts say, is out of control.1  They 
say it promotes censorship and ―redistributes wealth upwards.‖2  The right 
of publicity creates significant tension and, indeed, threatens core values of 
free speech.3  The right of publicity, in short, has a lot of analytical prob-
lems and yet, like all other forms of intellectual property (―IP‖), has ex-
panded faster than Steven Segal‘s waistline in recent years.4  In this piece, I 
would like to sketch how the expansion of the right of publicity fits into the 
rest of IP expansion, with a focus on trademark law and copyright law in 
the area of artistic creation. 
The right of publicity shares the closest doctrinal similarity to trade-
mark law.5  Furthermore, virtually every celebrity right of publicity case is 
co-joined with a Lanham Trademark Act claim.6  Right of publicity cases, 
like trademark claims, make sense and are typically uncontroversial when 
they occur in a zone of pure commerce, such as advertising use.  Both 
claims become problematic when they move toward artistic-related uses.7  
 
 Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, CA; J.D., Yale Law School.  
Thanks to Aaron Swabach, Mark Schultz, Deven Dessai, Yvette Lieberman, and Lisa Ramsey for 
thoughtful comments and critiques on this article.  Any errors or omissions are strictly my own. 
 1 See, e.g., Gil Peles, The Right of Publicity Gone Wild, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301, 301 (2004) 
(noting that the right of publicity ―is now utilized more than ever before‖). 
 2 See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 136–37 (1993). 
 3 See John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Interme-
diate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1228–29. 
 4 See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 225, 226 (2005) (remarking that the ―current right of publicity . . . has expanded to allow 
claims against an ever-increasing range of conduct‖). 
 5 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trade-
mark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2006) (remarking that ―the right of publicity has more in 
common with trademark law than with copyright‖). 
 6 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‘g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v. LaFace 
Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 7 See K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doc-
GREENE 11/10/2008 1:04 PM 
522 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:521 
Similarly, IP expansion in copyright, trademark, and right of publicity con-
texts makes sense and is socially beneficial when it promotes great artistic 
incentives and freedom to create.  It causes problems when it impinges 
upon creative freedom and unduly reduces accumulation of the public do-
main.  My thesis is that IP expansion should look to enhance artistic crea-
tion at the bottom of the entertainment ecosystem, where the real creativity 
has always originated, rather than at the top of distribution, where the pub-
lic domain tends to be the most burdened and the net gains to social prod-
uctivity are the most attenuated. 
In keeping with the theme of my work of recent years, I will use Afri-
can-American cultural production as a starting point of analysis.  My rea-
sons for doing so are three-fold: first, black cultural production is at the 
center of expressive creativity in American culture and has been since the 
slave songs of the 1800‘s and blues and jazz of the 1900‘s, up through the 
rap music of today.8  Second, black artists can stand in for socially and 
economically disadvantaged persons of all groups—blacks have been at the 
―bottom of the barrel‖ of American society until very recent times.  Third, 
as blacks have become upwardly mobile within society, their treatment il-
lustrates how economic stratification skews the benefits of IP protection. 
I.  THE ―BEEF‖ BETWEEN IP RESTRICTORS AND EXPANSIONISTS 
Using an analogy for hip-hop music, where a long-running dispute, or 
―beef,‖ has existed between East and West Coast rappers, in recent years a 
―beef‖ has emerged between two camps, the IP Restrictors and the IP Ex-
pansionists.  The divide typically features ―rights holders, their investors 
and representatives‖ on the one side and ―[liberal] academics . . . consumer 
advocates, and civil libertarians‖ on the other.9  In rap ―beefs,‖ someone 
often ends up getting shot.  In IP ―beefs,‖ no one has been shot to date or, 
at least, there is no record of violence; but there can be considerable snip-
ing among academics, as any attendee at events such as American Associa-
tion of Law Schools (―AALS‖) IP section meetings and various IP scho-
lars‘ forums around the country can attest.10 
 
trine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 609, 617 (2004) (distinguishing artistic use from purely commercial use). 
 8 K.J. Greene, ―Copynorms,‖ Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over African-
American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1186–87 (2008) [hereinafter Copynorms]. 
 9 Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 16 
(2006) (describing different camps in debate over digital rights management in the IP context). 
 10 Ann Bartow, When Bias is Bipartisan: Teaching About the Democratic Process in an Intellec-
tual Property Republic, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 715, 716 (2008) (remarking that ―[s]ome of the fiercest 
policy debates in academic intellectual property law are over the proper level of monopolistic protection 
the legal system should provide for copyrights, patents, and trademarks‖). 
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A. IP ―Restrictors‖ or Low Protectionists 
Broadly, IP Restrictors, sometimes referred to as ―low protection-
ists,‖11 contend that IP protection has expanded too wide and far in recent 
decades and wish to put the miscreant genie of IP expansion back in the 
bottle.  IP Restrictors are said to believe that the ―public domain and copy-
right are inversely correlated: if one grows, the other must shrink.‖12  To IP 
Restrictors, maintaining a robust public domain is vital, given its primary 
function of providing ―raw material for other works.‖13  IP Restrictors in-
clude many of the leading scholars in intellectual property.14  A scholar at 
the forefront of the anti-expansionist front is Larry Lessig, who contends 
that IP expansion ―locks down‖ culture and depletes the public domain.15 
B. IP ―Expansionists‖ or High Protectionists 
In opposition to IP Restrictors are the IP Expansionists, also known as 
―high protectionists.‖16  IP Expansionists are concerned that weak IP pro-
tection will lead to a tragedy of the commons ―if intellectual works are too 
readily appropriated . . . and advocate strong . . . intellectual property rights 
. . . as the solution for this tragedy.‖17  Expansionists, it is said, ―view ex-
emptions and privileges on the part of users or future creators as a tax on 
rights holders and have considerable sympathy for thinly disguised ‗sweat-
of-the-brow claims.‘‖18  Perhaps the biggest IP Expansionist is Congress, 
which in recent years seems to never have met an IP bill it did not like.  
Worse still, leading IP analysts such as Mark Lemley contend that ―[t]o a 
disturbing extent, Congress in recent years seems to have abdicated its role 
in setting intellectual property policy to the private interests who appear be-
fore it.‖19  State legislation also seeks to expand IP protection in the area of 
 
 11 Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Histographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Tho-
mas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 998 (2006) (referring to ―those who opposed strong intellectual 
property [rights] . . . as the ‗low protectionists‘ or ‗IP restrictors‘‖). 
 12 Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Exten-
sion and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2337 (2003). 
 13 Steven D. Jamar, Copyright and the Public Interest from the Perspective of Brown v. Board of 
Education, 48 HOW. L.J. 629, 638 (2005). 
 14 Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2343. 
 15 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). 
 16 Deborah Tussey, iPods and Prairie Fires: Designing Legal Regimes for Complex Intellectual 
Property Systems, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 115 (2007). 
 17 Id. 
 18 James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 
(2007) (quoting James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome?: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could 
Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 107–08 (F. Scott 
Kieff ed., 2003). 
 19 Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 
532 (2000).  Perhaps no one writes as prolifically and with such perceptiveness as Professor Lemley.  
My best line, I thought at least, was during a recent presentation at a fabulous conference on the right of 
publicity at Chapman Law School.  I had a PowerPoint slide with a quote from Lemley and, being short 
on time, I zoomed past the slide, saying, ―Who cares what Lemley thinks?‖  The IP academics in the 
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right of publicity.20  IP Expansionists think more of good thing can‘t be bad 
and pooh-pah the notion that IP legislation and court decisions impose 
costs on society that outweigh the benefits. 
Admittedly, like ―the Sneetches‖ of Dr Seuss—some who had stars on 
their bellies and others who did not, and were subsequently mixed up in 
McMonkey McBean‘s star-off machine—it can be hard to tell who is who 
on the roster of IP Restrictors and Expansionists.21  My own work, for ex-
ample, could fall into both camps.  When it comes to trademark expansion 
and particularly dilution, as well as the presumption of entitlement to in-
junctive relief in the motion picture copyright infringement context, I might 
be seen as a staunch Restrictionist.22  In contrast, critics might well see my 
work on black blues artists (advocating for distributive and corrective jus-
tice) as an expansion of IP rights.23 
The IP expansion versus restriction debate sets up some interesting 
contrasts and paradoxes.  ―Progressive‖ scholars are often in the Restric-
tionist camp, while corporate actors, and those we would typically deem 
conservative, are in the Expansionist camp.  The notion of remuneration for 
black artists is progressive, yet it would be opposed by a strict Restriction-
ist.  Similarly, an artists‘ rights movement is progressive in tone, yet IP re-
strictions could reduce those rights at the time they are expanding for cor-
porate actors and conglomerates.  To date, there is little in the way of 
concrete normative principles to guide determinations of when IP expan-
sion is good or IP restriction is bad. 
C. The ―Beat Down‖ of IP Restrictors by Congress and the Courts 
The beef between IP Restrictors and Expansionists, in hip-hop terms, 
is a ―beat down‖24—that is, a rout—in favor of the Expansionists.  Each 
area of IP protection—copyright, trademark, and patent—has grown 
through legislation and judicial decisions. 
1. Copyright Law Expansion 
The expansion of copyright protection in the law has been no less than 
stunning, leading commentators to note that ―the last century has witnessed 
a radical expansion in the scope of protections afforded copyright own-
 
crowd roared; the rest of the audience looked puzzled. 
 20 See Patrick McGreevy, A Bid to Protect Stars‘ Images, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at B1 (not-
ing that proposed California legislation will expand retroactive post-mortem rights of publicity for non-
relatives of dead celebrities). 
 21 See DR. SEUSS, The Sneetches, in THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 3 (1961). 
 22 See Greene, supra note 7, at 614 (contending that trademark litigation in the context of expres-
sive works imposes unjustified social costs); see also K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringe-
ment and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for Prelimi-
nary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173 (1999) [hereinafter Motion Picture] (calling into question 
automatic grants of injunctive relief in the motion picture context). 
 23 See Copynorms, supra note 8. 
 24 UrbanDictionary.com, Beat Down, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=beat+ 
down (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). 
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ers.‖25  We could begin with protection of copyright owners—typically, 
major record label distributors—in sound recordings in 1971.26  The 1980‘s 
were relatively quiet on the copyright front, besides the Bern Amendments 
on the international side.27  An artist-friendly amendment, the Visual Art-
ists‘ Rights Act (―VARA‖), was enacted in 1990.28  The law applied only 
to artists working in a fine art medium and was enacted, not out of solici-
tude for artists‘ rights, but rather to comply with international obligations to 
protect ―moral rights.‖29 
Congress increased the scope of criminal copyright infringement in 
1997.30  Congress also added protection to sound recording owners for digi-
tal audio transmissions in 1995.31  In 1998, Congress passed landmark leg-
islation to protect copyright owners‘ rights on the internet.32  In 1998, Con-
gress significantly extended the term of copyright.33  Further, Congress 
enhanced damages for copyright infringement in 1999.34 
Copyright expansion has taken place at such a robust clip, analysts 
contend that in recent years ―copyright has become . . . propertized.  The 
duration and scope of copyright have expanded so much that they now re-
semble the ‗fee simple‘ ownership held by landowners.‖35  Courts too can 
stand in as IP Expansionists—most famously, in the Supreme Court‘s re-
fusal to strike down the Copyright Term Extension Act (―CTEA‖), which 
added an additional twenty years to existing copyrights.36  The charge 
against the CTEA was led by Professor Lessig himself.37  Nonetheless, a 
―beat down‖ of the restrictive view occurred in the Supreme Court. 
2. Trademark Law Expansion 
Just as copyright law protection has skyrocketed, analysts have simi-
larly remarked that the ―expansion of trademark rights has been particularly 
 
 25 Tehranian, supra note 3, at 1210.  Tehranian sets forth numerous consequences of the ―dramat-
ic theoretical shift in the underpinnings of copyright law . . . .‖  Id. at 1211. 
 26 See Sound Recording Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-139, 85 Stat. 390 (1971). 
 27 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(1988). 
 28 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 102 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). 
 29 Id. 
 30 No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).  The No Electronic Theft 
Act (―NET‖) significantly enhanced liability for criminal copyright liability.  See Eric Goldman, A 
Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 
369, 373 (2003). 
 31 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 
336 (1995). 
 32 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 33 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). 
 34 Pub. L. No. 106-44, 113 Stat. 221 (1999). 
 35 Michael A. Carrier, The Propertization of Copyright, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 345, 345 (Peter K. Yu ed. 2007). 
 36 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 37 Id. at 191. 
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. . . dramatic . . . .‖38  Congress extended trademark protection for ―intent to 
use‖ applications in 1998.39  In 1995, Congress passed legislation that fede-
ralized the state law doctrine of trademark dilution.40  In 1998, Congress 
extended trademark protection to mark holders.41  A similar dynamic of ex-
pansion has impacted patent law, where commentators have contended that 
IP expansion has become self-regenerative: ―The assertion of or demand 
for property rights by some engenders the assertion of or demand for re-
lated property rights by others.‖42 
Analysts have attributed the expansion of IP rights to two factors: the 
trend to treat IP rights as pure property rights, and the increase in value of 
intellectual property goods, which have become ―a crucial set of corporate 
assets in the new information economy.‖43  IP expansion, it is said, creates 
tension with the notion of democratic culture: as ―media companies have 
sought in increasingly aggressive ways to protect their existing rights and 
expand them further[,]‖ a serious danger is posed to freedom of expres-
sion.44  Perhaps the most striking example of the willingness of rights hold-
ers in IP to use the law aggressively is the litigation strategy of the music 
industry, led by the Recording Industry Association of America (―RIAA‖).  
The RIAA, at the behest of large record labels, has instituted thousands of 
lawsuits against digital file-sharers, as well as numerous suits against com-
panies that produce file-sharing software.45  Clearly, the purpose of the 
RIAA lawsuits was to intimidate and instill fear.46  IP Restrictors, such as 
Professor Lessig, reject economic incentive theory by contending that 
―property rights in intellectual ideas enable owners to control their own 
works and ultimately stifle the creative process of others.‖47 
 
 38 Greene, supra note 7, at 611; see also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of 
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1896 (2007) (noting that ―courts, with some help from 
Congress, significantly broadened trademark law in the twentieth century‖). 
 39 Brooke J. Egan, Comment, Lanham Act Protection for Artistic Expression: Literary Titles and 
the Pursuit of Secondary Meaning, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1777, 1780 (2001). 
 40 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (2006). 
 41 Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998). 
 42 Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1917, 1921 (2007). 
 43 Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual 
Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 32 (2004) (quoting Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of 
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2235 (2000)). 
 44 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2004). 
 45 See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About 
Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 659–60 (2006). 
 46 See id. at 660. 
 47 See Sonia K. Katyal, Ending the Revolution, 80 TEX. L. REV.  1465, 1472 (2002) (reviewing 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
(2001)). 
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II.  THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS AN EASY TARGET FOR IP 
RESTRICTORS 
The right of publicity, like other forms of IP, has ―shown a remarkable 
tendency to expand along some dimensions,‖48 particularly as to protected 
indicia of identity.  Although it is contended that the right of publicity ―is 
both hard to object to and hard to support[,]‖49 the right of publicity makes 
an easy target for IP Restrictors, especially as it moves outside the com-
mercial realm and into the dimension of expression.  While there is abun-
dant scholarship critiquing the right of publicity, there are few truly robust 
defenses of the doctrine or its theoretical rationales.  Most of those that ex-
ist are by students, not academics.50 
A. The Right of Publicity and its Fundamentally Weak Justifications 
In recognition of costs imposed by intellectual property ownership, IP 
protections require analytical and pragmatic justification for their exis-
tence.51  IP Restrictionists point to justifications for limiting protection of 
intangible works by noting that exclusive rights in intangible IP works ―can 
impose more costs on the public than can exclusion rights over tangibles.‖52  
Some of the social costs of IP protection include anticompetitive distortion, 
interference with creative production of works, and asymmetrical invest-
ment in research and development.53 
Much has been written about the growing tendency to treat IP just like 
any other form of property.  To merely treat IP like any other form of prop-
erty is fallacious: ―real property and intellectual property analogies are un-
satisfying from more than a theoretical point of view; they have direct im-
pact on the manner in which benefits are distributed as between right-
holders and the public.‖54  As Professor Litman has remarked, ―To agree to 
treat a class of stuff as intellectual property, we normally require a showing 
that, if protection is not extended, bad things will happen that will outweigh 
the resulting good things.‖55 
 
 48 David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 71, 91 (2005). 
 49 Id. at 122. 
 50 See, e.g., Seth A. Dymond, Note, So Many Entertainers, So Little Protection: New York, The 
Right of Publicity, and the Need for Reciprocity, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447 (2003) (arguing that New 
York should expand right of publicity protection to commensurate levels of California and Tennessee). 
 51 See Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innova-
tors, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365, 369 (2007) (remarking that ―[p]roperty rights (and intellectual property 
rights) are justified only by their social utility‖). 
 52 Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 159, 159 (2002). 
 53 Safrin, supra note 42, at 1966–67. 
 54 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Gen-
eration, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 409 (1990). 
 55 Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1717, 1729 (1999). 
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The right of publicity has inherently weak theoretical justifications 
compared to the IP regimes of patent and copyright law.  It is said that the 
―weakness of the rationales generally proffered for the right of publicity 
undermines the argument that there is a compelling or substantial govern-
ment interest to limit dissemination of image copies.‖56  In the case of pa-
tent law—which provides wonderful useful inventions and concomitant 
products such as Viagra—and copyright law—which results, theoretically, 
in an expanded array of film, music, theatre, literature, dance, and comput-
er programs (huh?)—the justification seems self-evident.  Patent and copy-
right law both find their basis in the Constitution,57 and, despite contentions 
by a few scholars (such as Ray Ku) that copyright has outlived its useful-
ness in the digital age,58 scholars for the most part agree that these regimes 
serve a valuable social function.59  Trademark law, unlike copyright, patent, 
and right of publicity, is not based on incentive theory, but rather in theo-
ries of economic efficiency in connection with reduced consumer search 
costs.  In contrast, as Professor Stacey Dogan has posited, the theoretical 
justifications for the right of publicity are far more elusive.60  Numerous 
scholars have outlined the fundamentally weak basis of publicity rights in 
connection with theoretical rationales for intellectual property.61 
B. Economic Incentive Theory 
Incentive theory comprises the main theoretical basis for copyright 
and patent protection.  Incentive theory posits that, if the law did not pro-
vide an economic incentive for authors and inventors, society would see 
less production of artistic creation and scientific invention.62  In contrast to 
trademark and copyright, where economic analyses are fruitful and multip-
ly, it has been noted that ―few economic analysts of the law have studied 
the right of publicity.‖63  The Supreme Court has only touched upon public-
ity rights once—in a weird case involving a news station‘s unauthorized 
rebroadcast of a cannonball act64—setting forth an economic incentive ra-
tionale for the right of publicity.65 
 
 56 F. Jay Dougherty, All the World‘s not a Stooge: The ―Transformativeness‖ Test for Analyzing 
a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 69–70 (2003). 
 57 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 58 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Eco-
nomics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002). 
 59 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); Tehranian, supra note 3. 
 60 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1162. 
 61 See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 56, at 69 (remarking upon the ―weakness of the rationales 
generally proffered for the right of publicity . . . .‖). 
 62 See, e.g., Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, Between Thought and Possession: Artists‘ ―Moral 
Rights‖ and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2291 (1993) (noting that economic 
incentives are a ―fundamental assumption of the [U.S.] copyright system . . . .‖). 
 63 Vincent M. de Grandpré, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Economic Analysis of 
the Right of Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 77 (2001). 
 64 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 65 See id. at 575 (holding that broadcast of plaintiff‘s cannonball act deprived plaintiff of the eco-
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On the one hand, it is hard to argue against incentive theory in the ab-
stract—we have concrete proof that the United States leads the world in 
creative and technological production.66  On the other hand, the treatment 
of a highly creative group—African-American music artists and composers 
who operated without creative incentives—hints that incentive theory itself 
might well be fundamentally flawed.  There has been little, if any, ―syste-
matic study of the effects of such [intellectual property rights] on the hun-
dreds of [IP] industries that they are designed to encourage.‖67  Skeptics 
question the utility of patent and copyright incentives, noting that ―other 
incentive structures exist to stimulate the creation of new works and inven-
tions . . . .‖68  Putting that aside, the right of publicity hardly seems self-
evident at all; there is no tangible end-product and it is difficult to quantify 
the value of ―fame.‖ 
Moreover, numerous analysts note that it seems silly to suggest that 
individuals need an added incentive to become famous.  Professor Kwall 
has argued that ―creativity is spurred largely by incentives that are noneco-
nomic [sic] in nature.‖69  Analysts have long noted that our society already 
rewards successful athletes, actors, and entertainers for their contributions 
with sizable sums of money, amply compensating them for their ―sweat 
equity.‖70  Commentators have noted that it might even be possible for a 
misappropriation to ―actually increase the celebrity‘s market power for fu-
ture endorsements.‖71 
Other commentators posit that ―[n]ot a shred of empirical data exists 
to show that anyone would change her behavior with regard to her primary 
activity . . . [as a sports star or entertainer] if she knew in advance that, af-
ter achieving fame, she would be unable to capture licensing fees from . . . 
[merchandising].‖72  If one becomes a famous rock star, she gets a fat re-
cording contract, a film deal, and a perfume line, a la J. Lo.  Accordingly, 
publicity rights in fact do ―not provide any meaningful incentives for crea-
tivity, and they can be attacked as an unfair redistribution of wealth from 
 
nomic value of the act under Ohio right of publicity law).  The Zacchini court held that the right of pub-
licity ―provides an economic incentive‖ for performers.  Id. at 576. 
 66 See 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12207–08 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) 
(―American business and investors have been extremely successful and creative in developing intellec-
tual property and trade secrets.  America leads the nation‘s [sic] of the world in developing new prod-
ucts and new technologies.‖). 
 67 Tussey, supra note 17, at 118. 
 68 Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 189, 216 (2006). 
 69 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic 
Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1970 (2006). 
 70 Fred M. Weiler, Note, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case for Privileged Appropria-
tion of Identity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 243 (1993).  Weiler notes that the economic incen-
tive argument in connection with the right of publicity ―fails to distinguish between the entertainment 
value generated by celebrities and the value of what is secured by a right of publicity.‖  Id. at 244. 
 71 Matthew Savare, Comment, The Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in Calculat-
ing Compensatory Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 171 (2004). 
 72 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free 
Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 283, 306 (2000). 
GREENE 11/10/2008 1:04 PM 
530 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:521 
consumers to famous people.‖73  Incentive theory is ill-suited to justify the 
right of publicity. 
C. Incentives and ―Toxic‖ Fame 
One of the purported benefits of trademark law is that it adds to social 
utility by encouraging mark-holders to invest in quality product and servic-
es.  The economic perspective of trademark law posits that trademark ―pro-
vides incentives to create higher quality products and that consumers will 
benefit from the higher quality.‖74  Assuming that the right of publicity is 
an analytical cousin of trademark, the economic incentive paradigm of 
quality can be analogized to the infamous glove in the O.J. Simpson case—
it simply does not fit.  This is because the right of publicity applies to both 
the famous and the infamous; that is, to ―Einstein as well as Frankens-
tein.‖75 
If celebrities are analogues to trademark producers, in modern society 
there may in fact be reduced incentives to create a ―higher quality product‖ 
vis-à-vis persona.  We live in the age of ―toxic‖ fame, where celebrities of-
ten seem to engage in outlandish and anti-social behavior, which increases 
value in marketability.  In the world of celebrity ―hip-hop,‖ for example, it 
is a badge of honor to be incarcerated, and a badge of shame to testify or 
―snitch‖ on unlawful conduct.76  Professor Paul Butler, in a thoughtful ex-
ploration of hip-hop‘s impact on criminal law, argues that to ―say hip-hop 
destigmatizes incarceration understates the point: Prison, according to the 
artists, actually stigmatizes the government.‖77 
As the careers of MC Hammer and Vanilla Ice both demonstrate, lack 
of ―street cred‖ can be fatal to a continuing career in the industry.  Toxic 
fame is certainly not limited or generic to the hip-hop nation alone.  Celebr-
ities such as Britney Spears, Paris Hilton—whose only talent seems to be 
the ability to generate attention for being famous—and Lindsay Lohan, 
have all had well-publicized problems with alcohol and drug addiction. 
D. Misappropriation Rationales 
This great republic was essentially built upon ―takings‖ from people—
land from Native Americans and Mexico, labor from African slaves and 
Chinese rail workers.  However, a bedrock principle of American law dic-
 
 73 Gerard N. Magliocca, From Ashes to Fire: Trademark and Copyright in Transition, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 1009, 1039 (2004). 
 74 Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of Trademarks, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 823, 842 (2007) (cit-
ing work of William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner).  But Doellinger contends that concepts of 
―property, incentives and the public domain . . . have no relevance to trademark jurisprudence.‖  Id. at 
857. 
 75 This phrase is borrowed from an Anthony Robins motivational tape. 
 76 See Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward A Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
983, 997–98 (2004). 
 77 Id. at 997.  He contends that hip-hop culture ―justifies rather than excuses some criminal con-
duct.‖  Id. at 998. 
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tates that we not reward ―free-riders‖—those who would appropriate value 
created by others and thus ―reap where [they have] not sown . . . .‖78  This 
can be seen in recent debates about the role of welfare in our society and 
the indelible image of the ―welfare queen‖—an inner-city black woman 
who lives lavishly off the government dole.79  The stereotype of the welfare 
queen is a classic free-rider metaphor.  The misappropriation doctrine is a 
broad principle that ―posit[s] that the inherent wrongfulness of some acts 
requires intervention by the state to prevent undesirable outcomes and to 
deter socially reprehensible acts.‖80  In intellectual property law there is 
great concern for ―free-riders‖ who take the benefits established by others. 
In the right of publicity context, commercial use of a celebrity‘s or 
non-celebrity‘s image would appear to be a clear-cut case of free-riding.  
So, for example, where a portable toilet manufacturer decided to call its 
product, ―Here‘s Johnny, The World‘s Foremost Commodian,‖ it sought to 
trade off of the fame of comedian Johnny Carson, reaping a premium off of 
a fame it had not sown.81  However, leading scholars are openly disdainful 
of a broad free-rider metaphor of misappropriation.  Richard Posner, for 
example, has called for jettisoning misappropriation as ―the overarching 
principle that would rationalize intellectual property law as a whole and 
provide guidance for altering, perhaps expanding, the scope of that law.‖82 
Posner calls upon the recognition that ―free riding on intellectual 
property is not always a bad thing[.]‖83  In the right of publicity context, 
Posner contends that no celebrity expects to fully externalize all gains in 
the value of image: a celebrity 
is unlikely to invest less than he would otherwise do in becoming a movie star or 
other type of celebrity merely because he‘ll be unable to appropriate the entire 
income [arising from use of name or likeness]; there is free riding but not the 
type that threatens to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs . . . .84 
Similarly, Professor Lemley openly ―disses‖ the free riding paradigm, 
arguing that ―there is no need to fully internalize benefits in intellectual 
property‖ and that such efforts will result in a net loss to society and invite 
anti-social behavior, such as rent-seeking.85 
 
 78 See Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).  This case is the founda-
tional basis for IP misappropriation doctrine. 
 79 The ―Welfare Queen‖ stereotype arose during Ronald Reagan‘s 1976 presidential campaign, 
and was based on the belief in a ―sexually irresponsible [person] who bred children just to fatten her 
welfare check and then wasted the money recklessly on herself.‖  Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and 
Punishment in the New Age of Reprogenetics, 54 EMORY L.J. 1343, 1345 (2005).  An irony of the ste-
reotype was that ―African-Americans have never constituted a majority of those on welfare.‖  Peter 
Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune, New Lyrics?, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL‘Y 389, 392 (2004). 
 80 Greene, supra note 7, at 617. 
 81 Carson v. Here‘s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 82 Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 621 (2003). 
 83 Id. at 625. 
 84 Id. at 634. 
 85 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1032 (2005). 
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E. The ―Overexposure‖ Rationale 
Many celebrities carefully guard and limit use of their images; perhaps 
the greatest in this respect was actress Greta Garbo, who famously wanted 
―to be let alone.‖86  This is in sharp contrast to pop singer Janet Jackson, 
who in 2004, had an infamous ―wardrobe malfunction‖ on national televi-
sion—at the Super Bowl, no less.87  Janet‘s brother, Michael Jackson, hold-
er of the record for best-selling album, Thriller,88 was also accused of over-
exposure of a different body part.89  Overexposure in the celebrity context 
results in a diminished career; in slang, it is known as being ―played out.‖90  
In economic parlance, ―the identity of celebrities may be over- . . . ex-
ploited . . . [resulting in] negative externalities.‖91  However, the unholy 
marriage of the entertainment industry and advertising has made it much 
more likely that we will see the accumulation of profit from greater use of 
celebrity images.92  It is noted that 
[a]dvertising executives, in a concerted effort to improve their business, are at-
tempting to reinvent the marriage between advertising and entertainment 
 . . . industries . . . [by] expanding product placements in films and television 
shows, creating shows around products, becoming sole sponsors of . . . shows . . . 
[and further exploiting celebrity image].93 
The over-exposure rationale for publicity rights—sometimes called a 
theory of allocative efficiency—posits that, if the law allows unlimited use 
of a celebrity‘s image, that image will be worth less over time, as the public 
will grow tired of it.94  Professor Lemley has noted that the Federal Circuit 
has endorsed the ―overexposure‖ theory and contends that overexposure 
theory, ―is not only distinct from, but indeed largely at odds with, the clas-
sic [economic] incentive story.‖95  The overexposure theory is very close, if 
not identical, to a dilution-by-blurring theory.  Under the Lanham Act, a 
―famous‖ trademark is entitled to protection against dilution.96  Blurring 
occurs ―when a third party uses a famous mark to identify its own product 
 
 86 Peter B. Flint, Greta Garbo, 84, Screen Icon who Fled her Stardom, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/specials/magazine4/articles/garbo1.html. 
 87 Keith Olbermann, Countdown with Keith Olbermann: Janet Jackson‘s Wardrobe Malfunction, 
MSNBC.COM, Feb. 3, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4147857/. 
 88 MICHAEL JACKSON, THRILLER (Sony Records 1982). 
 89 See Mike Brooks et al., Jackson Booked on Suspicion of Molestation, CNN.COM, Nov. 25, 
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/20/jackson/. 
 90 UrbanDictionary.com, Played Out, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=played+ 
out (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 91 de Grandpré, supra note 63, at 103. 
 92 See Matthew Savare, Comment, The Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in Cal-
culating Compensatory Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 179–80 (2004). 
 93 Id. 
 94 See McKenna, supra note 4, at 269–70 (citing Landes and Posner‘s contention that ―overgraz-
ing on identity leads to ‗face wearout,‘ a reduction in the value of one‘s persona due to declining inter-
est in the person as her persona is increasingly used‖). 
 95 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129, 142 (2004). 
 96 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
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in a nonderogatory way.‖97  The theory underlying dilution is that, if the 
law permits willy-nilly use of a trademark, even if no consumer confusion 
is evident, there is still harm to the mark-holder, who has invested goodwill 
in its mark. 
Dilution law, however, has been subject to scathing critique, particu-
larly the theory of dilution-by-blurring, which lacks almost any objective 
evidence of harm in the trademark context.  It is said that the ―mismatch 
between dilution‘s stated purpose and hidden goal, [of preventing free-
riding on famous marks, leaves dilution as] a clumsy and largely incoherent 
doctrinal device.‖98  In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the Supreme 
Court attempted to put a limitation on dilution theory by requiring proof of 
actual dilution.99  However, Congress soon overturned that decision legisla-
tively at the behest, and for the benefit of, large corporate mark-holders.100  
Analysts have discounted the overexposure theory. 
F. Personality Theory 
A much stronger candidate as a justification for publicity rights is per-
sonality theory, although it was frowned upon in dicta in the Zacchini 
case.101  Scholars such as Justin Hughes have tied personality theory, of 
which moral rights doctrine is a subset, to the right of publicity.102  The phi-
losophical basis of personality theory draws from the works of Hegel and 
Kant.103  European regimes, under the auspices of the ―droit moral,‖ recog-
nize that there are intangible characteristics of IP that cannot be quantified 
in pure economic terms.104 
Professor Roberta Kwall is a leading proponent of the use of moral 
rights type personality theory in the right of publicity context.105  Kwall po-
sits that doctrinal similarities exist between moral rights doctrine and the 
right of publicity—notably, that both doctrines ―seek to protect the integrity 
of texts by rejecting fluidity of interpretation by the public in favor of the 
 
 97 Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1058 (2006). 
 98 David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-
Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HAST. L.J. 117, 117 (2005). 
 99 See 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). 
 100 See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 101 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
 102 Justin Hughes, ―Recoding‖ Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. 
L. REV. 923, 924 (1999).  For an interesting critique of Hughes‘ thesis, see Sarah LaVoi, The Value of 
Recoding Within Reason: A Review of Justin Hughes‘ ―Recoding‖ Intellectual Property and Over-
looked Audience Interests, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 171, 172 (2004) (contending that 
Hughes‘ work ―overlooks the importance of some recoding freedom as a tool necessary for valuable 
cultural revolution‖). 
 103 Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1541–42. 
 104 ―Droit moral‖ is French for ―moral rights.‖  Two of the main rights consist of the right to be 
known as the author of the work (paternity), and the right to prevent mutilations or distortions of the 
work that are prejudicial to the author‘s honor or reputation (integrity).  See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, 
Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).  
 105 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed 
Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151. 
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author‘s interpretation,‖ and that both doctrines ―focus on assaults to the 
author‘s reputation and personality.‖106  Professor Kwall‘s approach would 
focus less on distinctions between commercial and non–commercial use, 
but rather on ―misappropriations or mutilations of one‘s persona in situa-
tions where damage to the human spirit, rather than economic harm, is the 
focus.‖107  Right of publicity restrictionists, such as Professor Doughtery, 
point out that a personality theory of the doctrine ―does not provide a ratio-
nale for a property type right which is assignable and descendible—in other 
words a right of publicity, as understood in U.S. jurisprudence.‖108 
However meritorious personality theory may be in the context of the 
right of publicity, it carries a double-edged sword for artistic development.  
For example, conduct that constitutes a ―mutilation‖ might or might not be 
actionable as defamatory.  However, defamation law sets very high stan-
dards of proof and injury to prevent conflict with First Amendment prin-
ciples,109 and, indeed, the harshest criticism of the right of publicity focuses 
on the harm it can inflict on free expression. 
G. The Right of Publicity as the Cesspool of IP Expansion 
The right of publicity might be seen as the cesspool of accumulated 
―gunk‖ arising out of the expansion of IP.  At its worse, we see rich celebri-
ties, such as Tiger Woods, who sought to enjoin a painter from selling art 
depicting his image at the historic 1997 Masters tournament,110 or, more re-
cently, former celebrities, such as the late Evel Kneviel, attempting to en-
join rapper Kanye West from re-enacting Kneviel‘s 1970‘s era motorcycle 
jump across the Colorado River in West‘s rap video.111  Another way of 
looking at the right of publicity, however, is from the perspective of artists‘ 
rights.  When we think of musical artists, for example, one cannot help but 
note that, as soon as artists establish a successful music career, they attempt 
to move out of the music industry. 
The music industry is well known for its overreaching and exploitative 
conduct, with standard contracts described by music artists as ―unconscion-
able, indentured servitudes, and . . . impossible . . . .‖112  Recent years have 
witnessed bankruptcies of top-selling artists and royalty disputes that reveal 
 
 106 See id. at 158. 
 107 Id. at 166. 
 108 See, e.g., F. Jay Dougherty, Foreword, The Right of Publicity—Towards a Comparative and 
International Perspective, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 421, 443 (1998). 
 109 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1963) (holding that the constitution guar-
antees ―a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‗actual ma-
lice‘ . . . .‖). 
 110 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ‘g, 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 111 Associated Press, Evil Knievel Sues Kanye West Over Video, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 12, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16171599. 
 112 Tracy C. Gardner, Expanding the Rights of Recording Artists: An Argument to Repeal Section 
2855(b) of the California Labor Code, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 721, 722 (2007) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
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sharp business practices and sham accounting.113  The same can be said for 
the film industry, where a recent lawsuit claims that, despite worldwide 
profits of billions of dollars, the film distributors of the Lord of the Rings 
have failed to pay gross profits to the estate of Tolkien.114  These cases illu-
strate that the nature of IP expansion has been to reward entertainment 
conglomerates, with proportionally little ―trickle down‖ to artists and crea-
tors.  For example, it is said that while the record label of multi-platinum 
artist Toni Braxton ―is estimated to have received net profits between sixty 
and seventy million dollars from her record sales . . . . Braxton only re-
ceived approximately five million dollars, or less than three percent of the 
gross.‖115  The right of publicity, then, ends up being a cesspool where mu-
sic and other artists suck up the dregs of IP protection. 
IP expansion, economic analysts say, also encourages ―rent seek-
ing‖—opportunistic conduct by actors seeking to extract surplus value from 
IP protection—often with consequences that add deadweight losses to so-
ciety, such as frivolous and semi-frivolous litigation, demands for exces-
sive damages, and claims for injunctive relief in the classic ―holdover‖ 
sense.  I call this conduct IP ―nihilism.‖  It is a mindset that says, ―Let‘s 
find a case where we can go after a major studio or record label or TV net-
work for the most trivial violation of IP rights, demand an injunction, and 
extract a large settlement plus attorney‘s fees.‖  The film studios, record 
labels, and RIAA‘s of the world have made it a priority to pursue every 
claim of trademark or copyright infringement possible through cease and 
desist letters and, in the case of RIAA, mass litigation against consumers.116 
In the trademark context, I characterized this conduct as ―abusive 
trademark litigation.‖117  Much right of publicity litigation could similarly 
be characterized as abusive in nature—plaintiffs bringing claims where 
there are no real damages or significant non-economic damages, either as 
rent-seekers or to send a ―message‖ regarding boundary intrusion on a 
property right.  If creators were truly the beneficiaries of their creativity—
for example, if we had a copyright and contract system in the music indus-
try that paid fair compensation—perhaps we might not need a ―cesspool‖ 
of residual right of publicity claims. 
 
 113 See, e.g., id. 
 114 Janet Shprintz, Tolkien Estate Sues New Line, VARIETY, Feb. 11, 2008, http://www.variety. 
com/article/VR1117980703.html. 
 115 David C. Norrell, Comment, The Strong Getting Stronger: Record Labels Benefit from Pro-
posed Changes to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 445, 456 (1999). 
 116 See, e.g., Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works (Jan. 11, 2008), 
http://info.riaalawsuits.us/howriaa_printable.htm. 
 117 Greene, supra note 7, at 614. 
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III.  RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STORIES 
Stories are a way of helping to understand how abstract legal prin-
ciples work in the ―real‖ world.118  Right of publicity stories reveal three 
facets of the publicity rights.  Too little protection results in dignitary 
harms that society should find unacceptable, but too much protection sup-
ports restrictionist arguments that the right of publicity dampens creative 
cultural activity.  Individuals at the lower end of the social hierarchy—the 
non-celebrity and the ―Aunt Jemima‖—can suffer exploitation with no re-
striction on the use of image in both expressive and commercial settings.  
Famous individuals, such as rapper, Chuck D., can show dignitary harm 
from use of persona.  On the other hand, the dignitary interests of a cultural 
icon, such as Rosa Parks, might need to take a back seat in the context of 
creative expression.  Additionally, the case of 50 Cent reflects ambivalence 
between those who trade in ―toxic‖ fame and those concerned with dignita-
ry/moral rights. 
A. The Under-Protection of Non-Celebrities 
Although under a majority view the right of publicity protects both ce-
lebrities and non-celebrities alike,119 it is not often called ―the celebrity 
right of publicity‖ for nothing.  While the right of publicity might be said to 
overprotect celebrities, it tends to under-protect non-celebrities: non-
celebrities merely have a theoretical right of publicity that ―is often neg-
lected in practice.‖120  Much like federal trademark dilution law,121 which 
seems to provide the most protection to the big companies that need it the 
least, the right of publicity provides little protection to the ―little person‖ 
who arguably needs protection from well-financed entities, such as film 
producers and record labels. 
This point was brought home to me quite vividly when I did a consul-
tancy project on the right of publicity a few years ago.  Our client was a 
non-celebrity whose photographic image was used fairly extensively in a 
major Hollywood motion picture without his consent.  Under California‘s 
right of publicity statute, set forth in Civil Code section 3344,122 it was un-
likely he could assert a claim.  This is because the statutory right of publici-
ty in California requires use in advertising or merchandising,123 and it is 
 
 118 See generally JANE C. GINSBURG, ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STORIES 2–4 (2006). 
 119 See, e.g., Jordan Tabach-Bank, Missing the Right of Publicity Boat: How Tyne v. Time Warner 
Entertainment Co. Threatens to ―Sink‖ the First Amendment, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 247, 254 (2004) 
(noting that a majority of jurisdictions extend ―protection to non-celebrities on the theory that fame or 
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 121 See The Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 122 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2008). 
 123 Id. (prohibits use of a person‘s ―name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness . . . on or in 
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doubtful at best that the Code would include motion picture use as advertis-
ing use. 
However, California provides the broadest protection to identity ap-
propriation under state common law.124  The common law right of publicity 
in California does not require use in advertising, but rather use ―to defen-
dant‘s advantage.‖125  Clearly, the motion picture studio‘s use here was to 
its advantage—out of a large universe of images, it chose our client‘s, and 
developed script around use of the image.  However, it is doubtful a non-
celebrity could prevail where his photo or likeness is displayed in a motion 
picture in California.  The studio attorneys vehemently and repeatedly cited 
the case of Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.126 in defending 
the claim. 
In Polydoros, the plaintiff sued a motion picture studio and its produc-
ers for use of his childhood image as ―Squints‖ Palledorous in the hit film 
―The Sandlot.‖127  The film‘s director was a childhood friend of Mr. Poly-
doros and reconstructed the image of his friend for the fictional character 
―Squints,‖ which was also plaintiff‘s childhood nickname.128  In rejecting 
plaintiff‘s right of publicity claims, the Polydoros court gave precedence to 
First Amendment values of free expression for a film producer over the in-
terests of the plaintiff.129 
Our legal team counter-argued that the display of a photographic im-
age in a motion picture is very different from reconstructing the persona of 
a childhood friend.  The use of Squints Palledorous was transformative in 
nature; the exhibition of an image in a film is not—nothing was changed in 
exhibiting the image.130  If the studio‘s position is correct, it would mean 
that the image of any American can be displayed and incorporated as a fic-
tional element in a film without that person‘s consent.  That sounds terribly 
wrong, at least from a privacy perspective.  It is also wrong today to as-
sume that there is always little economic gain in taking the name and like-
ness of non-famous individuals.  The reality television explosion demon-
strates the value of non-celebrity images through the use of using unknown 
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―actors‖ in their shows. 
Even had the client been able to establish liability on the claim in the 
face of Polydoros, his damages—due to lack of commercial value to his 
identity—would have been negligible, if cognizable at all.  A non-
celebrity‘s harms will be wholly non-economic in nature, given the lack of 
any marketable value for image.  Here an interesting doctrinal conundrum 
occurs.  Typically, where harms cannot be quantified, courts often grant in-
junctive relief.  However, injunctive relief in the expressive context of film 
carries severe free speech dangers.  Notwithstanding those dangers, courts 
do not hesitate to grant injunctive relief as a matter of course in both the 
copyright and trademark context—it is axiomatic that copyright infringe-
ment triggers an automatic presumption of irreparable harm.131  In contrast, 
in the right of publicity context and expressive use, courts rarely grant pre-
liminary injunctions, and there is no automatic presumption of harm as in 
the copyright and trademark context.132 
For non-celebrities then, the right of publicity is essentially a ―right 
without a remedy.‖133  Even where a non-celebrity plaintiff can establish a 
claim, problems in establishing damages will foreclose an effective cause 
of action.  For some analysts, this is considered a good thing, as they deem 
it ―folly . . . [to] exten[d] the right of publicity to noncelebrities [sic] who 
cannot demonstrate that their identity has any significant commercial val-
ue.‖134  However, denying a publicity claim to a non-celebrity discounts 
personality rationales of personhood.  Even if good reasons exist to restrict 
publicity claims in the non-celebrity conduct—and, some exist, particularly 
threats to free expression—the reasons for providing some protection to 
non-celebrities seem compelling.  Arguments against non-celebrity right of 
publicity claims,135 regardless of merit, in effect value commercial speech 
over rights of personhood.136 
B. MC Hammer: The Tale of Overexposure 
Perhaps no artist was hotter in the early 1990‘s on the hip-hop scene 
than MC Hammer.  From around 1990 through 1991, he produced a string 
of hits, including ―Let‘s Get It Started‖137 and ―U Can‘t Touch This.‖138  
 
 131 For an overview of preliminary injunctive relief in the copyright context, see Motion Picture, 
supra note 22. 
 132 See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm‘t Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (limiting in-
junctive relief of TV star Pamela Anderson for use of name and likeness in the context of a self-made 
sex tape marketed by defendants, but granting full injunctive relief under copyright claim). 
 133 There is a ―common law principle, recognized by the Supreme Court as early as Marbury v. 
Madison, that a right without a remedy is not a right at all.‖  Doe v. County of Ctr., Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 
456 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 134 See Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for 
Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1610 (2001). 
 135 See id. at 1611. 
 136 Id. at 1610. 
 137 M.C. HAMMER, Let‘s Get it Started, on LET‘S GET IT STARTED (Capitol Records 1988). 
 138 M.C. HAMMER, U Can‘t Touch This, on PLEASE HAMMER, DON‘T HURT ‗EM (Capitol Records 
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Along the way he generated millions of dollars in album sales, as well as 
allegations of copyright infringement.139  He might be most famous—not 
for the catchy music and amazing dance moves he created—but for blow-
ing millions of dollars with extravagant spending and a huge ―posse,‖ 
which was reputed to have cost him around $500,000 per month.140  By 
1992, his career had flamed out, and he declared bankruptcy in 1996.141  He 
lost pretty much everything, perhaps most tragically, the catalog and copy-
right ownership of his songs.142 
Hammer is an example of an artist who was overexposed.  In addition 
to recording songs and touring, he performed in television commercials for 
Taco Bell,143 and even had a Saturday morning cartoon for children featur-
ing his image.144  We could probably find other examples of artists whose 
careers suffered due to overexposure.  My short list would include the 
Spice Girls, Pee Wee Herman, and Vanilla Ice.  A warning sign of overex-
posure is the proliferation of parodies about an artist or individual.  In the 
case of Vanilla Ice and Hammer, the parodies could be particularly vi-
cious.145  As a result, it becomes ―uncool‖ to buy records or attend perfor-
mances of the artist.  Clearly, there is something intuitively attractive about 
an overexposure theory.  Even skeptics of overexposure concede that te-
dium with a persona ―may be accelerated, at least in terms of chronological 
time, as a result of overexposure.‖146 
However, attempting to prove causation between decline of the value 
of persona and overexposure is likely a fruitless task.  Moreover, the exam-
ples of overexposure result not from publicity right violations, but from 
overuse by celebrities themselves.  Still, if a link could be established be-
tween overexposure and decline of value of persona, it would perversely 
lend credence to the much-maligned theory of dilution by blurring. 
C. Aunt Jemima: The Tale of Misappropriation/Unjust Enrichment 
Aunt Jemima is a seminal figure in trademark law.  One of the early 
leading cases on a core trademark doctrine (the related goods doctrine) in-
volved the question of whether a defendant could use the mark ―Aunt Je-
 
1990); see also Steve Huey, MC Hammer Biography, All Music Guide, http://www.allmusic.com/cg/ 
amg.dll?p=amg&sql=11:kifrxq95ld6e~T1 (last visited Mar. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Hammer Biography]. 
 139 Hammer Biography, supra note 138. 
 140 See id.; see also Norrell, supra note 115, at 455–56. 
 141 Hammer Biography, supra note 138. 
 142 MC Hammer Sells Back Catalog, YAHOO! MUSIC, July 21, 2006, http://music.yahoo.com/ 
read/news/34343748. 
 143 IMDB.com, M.C. Hammer, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0358479/otherworks (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2008). 
 144 Hammer Biography, supra note 138. 
 145 See, e.g., Vanilla Ice Parody with Jim Carrey, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
XoWdYYKdbLI; MC Hammer Parody, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIkyqmck9B8; WEIRD AL 
YANKOVIC, I Can‘t Watch This, on OFF THE DEEP END (Volcano Ent. 1992) (parody of M.C. Hammer‘s 
song, U Can‘t Touch This). 
 146 McKenna, supra note 4, at 270. 
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mima‖ for pancake syrup, in light of the fact that the complainants had, to 
that point, limited their production to self-rising flour.147  The Second Cir-
cuit held that it could not, spawning the ―Aunt Jemina‖ doctrine, as it is 
known, to this day.148  The right of publicity story, like much of the history 
of blacks in IP law, is less well known.  In the late 1800‘s, the R.T. Davis 
Mill and Manufacturing Company was looking for a ―mammy‖ type black 
woman to be the marketing face for its pancake mix.  Reputedly, the first 
Aunt Jemima was a woman named Nancy Green, who assigned her rights 
to the use of her image for $5.00.149  How much is the image of Aunt Je-
mima worth?  By way of example, we could look to a recent case involving 
―Taster‘s Choice‖ Coffee.  In Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc.,150 a former 
model named Christoff sued Nestle USA for misappropriation of his like-
ness on the Taster‘s Choice line of coffee products.  At trial, the jury 
awarded Christoff $330,000 in damages and over $15,000,000 in profits.151  
On appeal, the judgment was reversed.152  The case is currently being re-
viewed by the California Supreme Court.153 
D. Chuck D: The Tale of Personality/Moral Rights 
Hip-hop music, also known as ―rap,‖ is an African-American art form 
that has been subject to legal analysis in the IP context, primarily for con-
troversies over digital sound sampling.  One of the pioneer rap groups that 
emerged in the late 1980‘s was Public Enemy.154  As a lawyer at a New 
York law firm, I had the privilege of representing Public Enemy in the ear-
ly/mid 1990‘s.  The lead rapper, Chuck D., was involved in a lawsuit that 
arose when McKenzie River Corporation—at the time, maker of the forty 
ounce malt liquor, St. Ides—used a snippet of Chuck D‘s voice in one of its 
beer commercials.155  Chuck D. had long vehemently denounced the sale of 
the ―40‖ in black communities and was outraged over the use.  He sued the 
brewer for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and violation 
of the right of publicity.156  At the time of suit, California had a more favor-
 
 147 Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 408 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 
672 (1918). 
 148 Id. at 412; see also, e.g., Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int‘l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 
199 (2d Cir. 1962) (referring to the ―Aunt Jemima Doctrine‖); S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 
175 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1949) (same); Quality Inns Int‘l v. McDonald‘s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 
211 (D. Md. 1988) (same); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 780 
(2004) (same). 
 149 MARILYN KERN-FOXWORTH, AUNT JEMIMA, UNCLE BEN, AND RASTUS: BLACKS IN 
ADVERTISING, YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW (1994). 
 150 Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. B182880, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 1137 (Ct. App. June 29, 
2007), rev. granted, No. S155242, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 12762 (Oct. 31, 2007). 
 151 Id. at *1. 
 152 Id. at *58. 
 153 Christoff, No. S155242, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 12762. 
 154 Steven Thomas Erlewine, Public Enemy Biography, All Music Guide,  http://www.allmusic. 
com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&sql=11:kifixq95ld6e~T1 (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
 155 Chuck D: ‗This One‘s Not For You‘: Battling Malt Liquor, ENT. WKLY, Sept. 27, 1991, avail-
able at http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,315630,00.html. 
 156 Id. 
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able right of publicity law than New York.  The New York right of publici-
ty statute, set forth in sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights 
Law, provided a claim for commercial appropriation of name, likeness, 
portrait, and picture.157  In contrast, California has both a common law right 
of publicity, which merely requires a use to ―defendant‘s advantage‖ and a 
statutory right of publicity that prohibits use in adverting or merchandis-
ing.158  Moreover, at the time of the Chuck D. suit, California provided pro-
tection to voice, a protection not available in New York until 1995.159  The 
Chuck D. lawsuit against the malt liquor company shows the personality 
rationale for the right of publicity at its nadir.  The harm to the artist is not 
primarily economic, but personal in nature.  It is doubtful, for example, that 
Chuck D. actually lost record sales as a result of the advertisement, yet the 
overall harm to reputation and dignity was significant.  The flip side of this 
case is the misappropriation facet—the malt liquor company was clearly 
using the artist‘s voice as a form of free-riding.  However, even if one does 
not believe the free-rider rationale holds weight, the dignitary harm is un-
deniable. 
E. Cultural Lockdown 
The right of publicity, like other forms of IP, has the capacity to chill 
expression and reduce the public domain.  Like trademark law—which 
―removes certain uses of . . . words, phrases, images, and product designs 
from the public domain, leaving other uses available to the public‖—the 
right of publicity limits access to cultural icons of celebrity and can remove 
―certain uses of the person‘s name or likeness from the public domain.‖160  
It falls into that category of law that facilitates the great lockdown of cul-
ture excoriated by commentators, such as Larry Lessig.161  A range of con-
duct, from fan web sites to music production that appear socially beneficial 
and consistent with the ―marketplace of ideas,‖ is suddenly transformed in-
to illegal conduct. 
F. 50 Cent: Free-riding and Misappropriation 
Rapper Curtis Jackson, better known as ―50 Cent,‖ is perhaps the anti-
Chuck D.  Whereas Public Enemy had a vibrant and controversial message 
of black empowerment and eschewed materialism, 50 Cent was a street 
thug living in the Jamaica, Queens section of New York City, reputedly 
 
 157 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (1992). 
 158 Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Ct. App. 2001) (explaining  
that the common law right of publicity is recognized in California and provides protection against the 
―‗appropriation‘ of a plaintiff‘s name or likeness for the defendant‘s advantage‖). 
 159 Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the 
Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1165, 1231–32 (2001). 
 160 Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 220 
(2002) (emphasis omitted). 
 161 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2001). 
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selling drugs for a living.162  In 2000, he was involved in a drug deal gone 
bad that resulted in him being shot nine times.163  ―Fiddy‖ survived, signed 
a record deal with Columbia Records, and then moved on to Universal Mu-
sic Group.164  In 2003, 50 Cent became a household name and an interna-
tional rap superstar with release of his album, ―Get Rich or Die Tryin‘.‖165  
Jackson did indeed ―get rich‖ and famous, although one might question if 
his success falls into the category of ―toxic fame‖ elucidated above. 
With success in the entertainment business come lawsuits; Jackson has 
been on both the giving and receiving end of litigation.  In the right of pub-
licity context, Jackson sued an auto dealer in 2004 for a print ad that fea-
tured the rapper‘s picture, a reference to a Dodge Magnum, and the phrase, 
―Just Like 50 Says!‖166  The car dealer‘s use of Jackson‘s image would, no 
doubt, fall into the category of misappropriation on a theoretical level.  It is 
a classic example of a defendant ―reaping where it has not sown.‖  There is 
nothing derogatory about the ad, ruling out a ―personality‖ based theory of 
recovery, nor could it be said that the use would depress any economic in-
centive of Jackson to cultivate his fame. 
On the other end of the spectrum, an online advertising company de-
cided to run a pop-up banner ad on the Internet that featured Jackson‘s 
likeness and was entitled ―Shoot the Rapper‖ and ―win $5,000 or five free 
ringtones GUARANTEED.‖167  Users were directed to aim and click their 
mouse to shoot the image.  Jackson filed suit for trademark and right of 
publicity appropriation and sought damages for $1 million plus punitive 
damages.  There is some irony in the notion that Jackson claimed he was 
personally offended by the ad,168 given his graphic lyrics which glorify vi-
olence and the ―player-pimp‖ lifestyle.  Unlike the print ad using ―Fiddy‖‘s 
image to promote car sales, the pop-ad here could arguably be deemed a 
form of social commentary or satire. 
Should the case of 50 Cent be treated the same as that of Chuck D.?  I 
think not.  50 Cent trades in violence, which is, by definition, what 
―gangsta‖ rappers do.  He can hardly claim serious dignitary harm in his 
image being used in a pop-up ad.  That is not to say he should not be en-
titled to some damages; but these should be proven, not assumed. 
 
 162 Jason Birchmeier, 50 Cent Biography, All Music Guide,  http://www.allmusic.com/cg/ 
amg.dll?p=amg&sql=11:wbfpxqqjldse (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) [hereinafter 50 Cent Biography]. 
 163 See Natalie Finn, 50 Cent Takes Aim at Shooting Game, E! ONLINE NEWS, July 20, 2007, 
http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=b6b5dfa2-fb8a-4e87-8dfe-7535de774aac. 
 164 Id.  Jackson was subsequently sued by the doctor who treated him for his gunshot wounds; 
according to the suit, Jackson failed to pay over $30,000 in medical bills due and owing.  Doctor Sues 
Rapper 50 Cent, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 7, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/ 
3006357.stm. 
 165 50 CENT, GET RICH OR DIE TRYIN‘ (Interscope Records 2003); see also 50 Cent Biography, 
supra note 162. 
 166 Sarah Hall, 50 Cent In Da Court, YAHOO! MUSIC, Aug. 23, 2005, http://music.yahoo.com/ 
read/news/23168868. 
 167 Finn, supra note 163. 
 168 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The right of publicity, for the most part, lacks substantial analytical 
support among the universe of intellectual property rationales and reflects 
what is bad, and even ugly, among the breakneck expansion of intellectual 
property rights.  Those favoring a restrictive approach to IP expansion ex-
press legitimate concerns about the threat of IP to a robust public domain, 
creative outputs, and freedom of expression.  Those concerns however, 
must be tempered by recognition of personhood interests of a dignitary na-
ture and the impact of restriction on a society that is stratified along race, 
gender, and economic lines.  Aunt Jemima is not similar to Tiger Woods.  
Further, IP restrictionists should also be sensitive to stratification within the 
world of artists, who often find their performance undervalued and appro-
priated without redress.  The same concern applies to non-celebrities, who 
often find they have a ―right‖ with no true remedy. 
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